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CHAPTER I 
PURPOSE STATEMENT
The Colstrip 3 Electric Generating Plant rate case 
filed by the Montana Power Company (MPC) was not only a 
contested issue, but it attracted wide media attention. 
What Montana Power does is of great interest to most people 
in the state. This paper identifies the primary issue of 
Colstrip 3 as the "used and useful" requirement of the 
Public Service Commission, i.e., the proven need for a 
facility before it could be included in the rate base of 
Montana Power. This "prove you need it" requirement must be 
met before the utility is allowed to include the facility 
into a rate increase request. Looking back, opposition to 
Colstrip 3 related rate increase request was principally due 
to the record amount of the increase asked for and the fact 
that it was much greater than originally estimated by 
Montana Power.
Throughout the course of this 27 month rate case, the 
two primary participants were Montana Power Company and the 
Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) which consisted of a 
five member elected board. However, this paper suggests a 
"third party" to this rate case. But, even though rarely 
mentioned it was somewhat obscured in its economic signifi­
cance. Who was this so-called "third party"? It is the
-  1 -
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various rating agencies whose job it is to publish financial 
information about companies such as Montana Power. These 
rating agencies grade each of the Company's securities. 
Standard & Poor's is one such agency, and Moody's is 
another.
The Colstrip 3 rate case is one illustration of the 
role that rating agencies play. The purpose of this paper 
is to provide a better understanding of the importance 
rating agencies played in the Colstrip 3 case.
-  2
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF THE MONTANA POWER COMPANY
Montana Power Company was formed on December 12, 1912
by the merger of four small hydroelectric generating com­
panies. Throughout the ensuing 74 years, Montana Power has 
served the nation's second largest utility territory of 
107,600 square miles, 73% of Montana's land area, by pro­
viding electricity and natural gas to 79% of Montana's 
population.
Montana Power is a diversified corporation operating 
principally in energy-related businesses. The Company is 
currently organized into two basic units as indicated below.
Nonregulated Business 
Enterprises
Entech, Inc
Electric and Natural 
Gas Utility Systems
Utility Division
The Montana Power Company 
Corporate Office
The Utility Division is responsible for the operation 
of the Company's electric and natural gas utilities under 
rate jurisdiction of the Montana Public Service Commission. 
Electricity sales to other utilities are under jurisdiction
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Entech, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Montana 
Power engaged in non-utility business activities. Its lines 
of business include the mining of coal and metals, the 
development and production of oil and natural gas, elec­
tronics, telecommunications, and real estate.
The following list of subsidiaries is provided to il­
lustrate the diversification of Montana Power.
Utility Division:
Electric Utility.
- Gas Utility.
Canadian-Montana Gas Company, Limited.
Canadian-Montana Pipe Line Company.
— Montana Power International Finance (Netherlands
Antilles)
** Colstrip Community Services Company.
Entech , Incorporated:
— Western Energy Company Minerals
- Northwestern Resources Company Minerals
- Dorado Energy Group Minerals
- Montana Mining Company (Brazil) Minerals
- Roan Resources, Limited Oil and Gas
- Altana Exploration Company Oil and Gas
- Intercontinental Energy Corporation Oil and Gas
- North American Resources Company Oil and Gas
—   ̂ -w
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- Tetragenics Company Technology
Telecommunications Resources, Inc. Technology
Sunlight Development Company Real Estate
Special Resource Management, Inc. Hazardous
Waste
Montana Power Company’s electric generating facilities 
are composed of hydroelectric and steam plants. The majori­
ty of the steam plants are coal fired, only one plant is 
being fired by either natural gas or oil and is currently 
shut down due to high operating costs. Montana Power may be 
fortunate not owning or operating any nuclear generating 
plants in 1986.
A composite list, Table I, represents Montana Power's 
electric resources available for the year 1985. Notice, 
however, that Colstrip Unit 4 is not included in the list. 
Montana Power decided to sell its 30% share of Unit 4, which 
represents 210,000 kilowatts, to United States Trust Company 
of New York as owner-trustee. The sale became official on 
December 30, 1985.
This decision by Montana Power to sell its 210 megawatt 
share of Colstrip 4 was made because of financial difficul­
ties after the PSC refused to allow Montana Power to charge 
users of Colstrip 3 generated power on the grounds that this 
facility's power was not needed.
- 5 -
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Name
Lake Diesel 
Old Faithful
Kerr
Thompson Falls
Milltown
Flint Creek
Madison
Hauser
Bolter
Black Eagle
Rainbow
Cochrane
Ryan
Morony
Mystic Lake
Table I
ELECTRIC RESOURCES
Location
Internal Combustion
Yellowstone Park 
Yellowstone Park 
Total Internal Combustion
Generating Plants Hydroelectric
Flathead River 
Clark Fork River 
Clark Fork River 
Flint Creek 
Madison River 
Missouri River 
Missouri River 
Missouri River 
Missouri River 
Missouri River 
Missouri River 
Missouri River 
East Rosebud River 
Total Hydro
Generating Plants Steam-Electric
Capacity 
Kilowatts (Kw)
2,750
2j_000
Bird Steam Plant 
Corette Steam Plan 
Colstrip Unit 1 
Colstrip Unit 2 
Colstrip Unit 3
Billings 
Billings 
Colstrip 
Colstrip 
Colstrip 
Total Steam-electric
*
*
*
*
*
* *
4,750 Kw
180,
40,
3,
1.8,16,
49, 
18, 
35,
50, 
60, 
47, 
11,
000
000
400
100
500
500
000
000
000
000
000
000
500
520,000 Kw
0
180,000
165.000
165.000
210.000 
720,000 Kw
Other
Firm Contracts and Replacement Power
Total Available, 1985
194,254 Kw 
1,439,004 Kw
*
* *
* * *
The Bird Steam Plant is not in service. 
Represents 50% share of Colstrip Units 1 and 2 
Represents 30% share of Colstrip Unit 3.
6 -
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CHAPTER III 
COLSTRIP 3 RATE CASE
A. Colstrip 2  Introduction
Montana Power began construction of Colstrip 3 in Sep­
tember, 1979, after nearly eight years of planning. Col­
strip 3 was the third of four generating facilities planned 
for construction at the mine mouth at Colstrip, Montana. 
Under the original agreements, Montana Power would own por­
tions of all four plants and would be responsible for the 
operation of the plants for the partners.
Some highlights, based on newspaper clippings and 
Montana Power information are presented here in chronologi­
cal order to explain what events transpired up to the time 
when the Colstrip 3 rate case was filed.
February, 1971. Colstrip area is selected by Mon­
tana Power as the site for future development of 
Colstrip 3 and 4 due to mine mouth location.
August, 1972. Montana Power completes a systems 
study on the possibility of building Colstrip 3 and 
4.
September, 1972. Montana Power and four other 
utilities sign a joint letter of intent to build 
Colstrip 3 and 4.
- 7 -
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November, 1972. Montana Power is designated Col­
strip project manager by the other four utilities. 
January, 1973. Montana State Board of Health asks 
Joseph McElwain, at the time, Montana Power Execu­
tive Vice President, if the Company is considering 
building Colstrip Units 3 and 4. "This is not 
true," McElwain said.
February, 1973. George O'Connor, then Montana Power 
Company President, tells the Utility's Board of 
Directors that the firm is studying the possibility 
of building Colstrip 3 and 4 with four other 
utilities.
March, 1973. Montana Power's coal mining subsidi­
ary, Western Energy Company, agrees to commit 170 
million tons of coal to the Colstrip project.
June, 1973. Montana Power Company, Pacific Power 
and Light Company, Puget Sound Power and Light 
Company, Portland General Electric Company, and 
Washington Water Power Company officially and pub­
licly file applications with the State Department 
of Natural Resources and Conservation for permits to 
build Colstrip 3 and 4. A filing fee of $1.23 
million was paid.
Montana Power's O'Connor said, "Based on in- 
depth studies we have already conducted, we are
“  8 —
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utterly convinced that Colstrip plants can be built 
and operated with minimal environmental effect.”
O'Connor said the proposed plants should be in 
full operation by 1978 or, "We in Montana and 
throughout the Northwest face the bleak prospect of 
power deficits that translate directly into lost 
jobs and productivity over a wide range of economic 
activity."
June, 1973. The five utilities unsuccessfully seek 
a waiver of the 600-day period for the Department of 
Natural Resources to study the Colstrip project. 
December, 1974. Department of Natural Resources 
issues a 2,000 page draft environmental impact 
statement on Colstrip project and conducts public 
hearings throughout the state.
January, 1975. Department of Natural Resources 
officially recommends against construction of 
Colstrip 3 and 4, saying that if such plants are 
built, "Montana could become a boiler room for the 
nation."
The Department of Natural Resources argued that 
coal should be shipped by rail out of the state 
instead of being burned at Colstrip and being 
transmitted out of state by power lines. It con­
cluded: "The Department is not persuaded that the
- 9 -
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obligation of Montana to the rest of the nation or 
the Pacific Northwest necessarily goes beyond making 
energy available through reasonable alternatives.” 
January, 1975. Montana's newly elected five-member 
Public Service Commission unanimously opposes 
construction of Colstrip 3 and 4, contending the 
plants are unnecessary.
March, 1975. State Board of Natural Resources 
begins hearings on Colstrip 3 and 4, but hearings 
are halted so the Board of Health can determine if 
the plants will meet air and water quality 
standards.
November, 1975. Board of Health unanimously rules 
that Colstrip 3 and 4 would not violate federal and 
state water and air quality standards. Board of 
Natural Resources' hearings are allowed to resume. 
June, 1976. Members of the Board of Natural Re­
sources secretly gathered in Helena to work on a 
Colstrip decision. At a public meeting the next 
day, the Board decides by 4-3 vote to conditionally 
issue the utilities a certificate of environmental 
compatibility and public need for the power plants, 
enabling construction to proceed.
July, 1976. Northern Cheyenne Tribe announces it 
will petition the U.S. Environmental Protection
10  -
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Agency (EPA) to designate its reservation near 
Colstrip as an area with pristine air quality 
standards.
July, 1976. Northern Cheyenne and Northern Plains 
Resource Council appeal the Board of Natural 
Resources decision approving Colstrip, contending 
the Board committed substantial errors in the 
process.
October, 1976, the E P A 's regional administrator 
rules that Colstrip 3 and 4 are covered by the 
agency's regulations designed to prevent the 
significant deterioration of air quality.
June, 1977. The five utilities decide to proceed 
with the construction of the power plants despite 
numerous court appeals.
August, 1977. EPA agrees to designate Northern 
Cheyenne Indian Reservation as Class I or pristine 
in air quality, a move that may prevent construction 
of Colstrip plants.
October, 1977. More than 100 angry union members 
stage a protest in front of the Federal Building in 
Billings over the work stoppage at Colstrip caused 
by the EPA's designation of Northern Cheyenne 
Reservation as Class I in air quality. They bear 
signs that say "Starvation kills faster than bad
-  11
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air” and "Out of work and hungry? Eat an 
environmentalist."
March, 1978. State District Judge Bennett reverses 
decisions by Board of Natural Resources approving 
Colstrip 3 and 4, condemning its proceedings as a 
"procedural travesty."
June, 1978. EPA refuses to issue a permit for 
Colstrip 3 and 4, saying air pollution from the 
plants will violate Class I air quality designation 
of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation.
April, 1979. Montana Supreme Court rules the Board 
of Natural Resources did commit procedural errors 
and gives the Board 90 days to correct them so that 
Colstrip construction can proceed.
September, 1979. Montana Supreme Court upholds the 
Board of Natural Resources' 1976 permit ruling which 
clears the way for construction to resume at 
Colstrip.
September, 1979. Reversing itself, EPA said 
Colstrip power plants 3 and 4 won't violate pristine 
air quality designation of Northern Cheyenne 
Reservation.
September, 1979. Utilities sign agreement with 
Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe, meeting federal 
environmental concerns and creating job training
-  12  -
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for Indians.
March, 1981. State sues the Bonneville Power 
Administration and eventually wins, forcing the 
federal agency to comply with the state siting law 
on power lines out of Colstrip.
June, 1981. U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
rejects Northern Plains Resources Counsel appeal of 
EPA ruling on air standards.
August, 1982. Colstrip construction work force 
peaks at 4,180 employees.
May, 1983. Board of Natural Resources calls for a 
hearing on whether to revoke the utility's permit in 
controversy over whether potential seepage from 
sludge pond violates condition in permit. Montana 
Power sued to block the hearing and won in District 
Court.
September, 1983. Utilities conduct steam blow on 
Unit 3 getting it ready for turbine roll.
September, 1983. Montana Power seeks a record $96.4 
million annual electric rate increase.
Colstrip electricity is produced by coal-fired 
generating plants located at the mouth of the largest coal 
deposit in the nation.
Every square foot of land in the Colstrip area contains
13 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
a 24-foot thick seam of coal that weighs one ton. Thus, 
there are 40,000 tons of coal beneath every acre of land. 
Montana Power, as of late 1983, had leases on about 585 
million tons of coal. When Colstrip 3 is fully operational, 
it will burn 450 tons of coal each hour - or about one coal 
train per day.
Colstrip coal produces 8,600 BTU's (British Thermal 
Units) of heat per pound. It contains 25% moisture, 9% ash 
and only 0.8% sulfur. It is because of these huge reserves 
of low-sulfur coal that Montana Power's generating plants 
are at Colstrip. Montana Power purchased the town of Col­
strip and adjoining leases from the Northern Pacific Rail­
road in 1950.
The rate increase sought for Colstrip 3 would cost much 
more than anyone, including Montana Power, had estimated. 
Montana Power attributes some of the error to the perils of 
forecasting power requirements.
One of those perils, Montana Power officials say, was 
the Anaconda Minerals Company. In the mid 1970's, when 
Colstrip 3 and 4 were in the planning stage. Anaconda 
Company said it would need 219 megawatts per year by 1982 to 
keep its plants and mills operating. However, due to the 
shutdown of the the Anaconda Company in Montana, the Company 
used only 51 megawatts in 1982, a 168 megawatt difference in
1 4
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projected demand was experienced as a result.
Another peril was the economic recession. If one con­
siders that the Colstrip 3 and 4 project was planned in 
1971, Montana Power forecasts are understandable. Montana 
Power’s forecasts were in error. They may have been as 
accurate as other utility’s forecasts, but not a one pre­
dicted the events that occurred during this period.
To be more specific, power deficits forecasted in 1976 
for the year 1979-1980, without Colstrip, 3 proved to be 
inaccurate for four reasons.
Since 1976, the Pacific Northwest had not experi­
enced a recurrence of the critically low water con­
ditions. These severely reduce the amount of 
hydroelectricity available from dams. In planning 
for Colstrip and other new plants, the Company uses 
critical water conditions.
From 1977 to 1983, Montana Power was able to acquire 
10% of the energy produced as a by-product from the 
Hanford Nuclear Plant in Richland, Washington. At 
the time of the 1976 hearings before the State Board 
of Natural Resources on the Colstrip projects, this 
purchased electricity supply was not forecasted as 
available, and thus was not included in the supply 
forecasts.
The closure of Anaconda Company smelter and refinery
15 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and the shutdown of its mining operations in Butte 
affected power requirements. Anaconda Company 
reduced the amount of electricity in its contract 
with Montana Power from 212 megawatts to 170 
megawatts in 1975. The amounts dropped to 153 
megawatts in late 1976 and to 85 megawatts in 
December, 1980 after the plant closures. In May, 
1983, Anaconda reduced its contract amount from 85 
megawatts to 11,8 megawatts when it suspended its 
mining operation in Butte,
The nationwide economic recession from 1980 to 1983 
caused the base loads to be 55 megawatts to 65 
megawatts less than Montana Power had expected,
B , $96,4 Million Electric Rate Request
As Colstrip 3 neared completion with an on-line date of 
January, 1984, Montana Power began preparation of a rate 
case filing to be presented to its regulating agency, the 
Montana Public Service Commission. The primary purpose of 
the rate case filing was to include the investments of 
Colstrip 3 into rate base in order to earn a return on those 
investments.
On September 30, 1983, Montana Power filed new rate
requests. The request amounted to a record $96,4 million, 
boosting its revenues by 55,4%, resulting in a rise in the
16 -
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electricity rate from the current rate of 3.98 cents per 
kilowatt hour to 6.35 cents per kilowatt hour.
By statute, the PSC must act on a rate increase request 
within nine months. If not, it automatically takes effect, 
subject to latter rebate. In this particular case, Montana 
Power agreed to extend the nine-month deadline by one month 
due to the delays in responding to the large volume of 
requests for more information. As a result of this delay, 
the PSC had until July 30, 1984, to complete its rate order. 
Otherwise it risked having the entire rate increase request 
take effect.
Most of the 55,4% increase could be directly attributed 
to the addition of Montana Power's 30% share of Colstrip 
power plant 3 to the Utility's rate base. The rate base 
consists of the Company's plant and investments. By 
statute, Montana Power is allowed rates which earn a market 
level return based on its plant investments.
In a prepared statement, Montana Power Executive Vice 
President Jack Burke defended the rate request. He said 
that the Utility officials recognize the $96.4 million in­
crease "is a large figure" but said two additional factors 
must be taken into consideration.
First, Montana Power's 210 megawatt share of Colstrip 3 
"is not only needed but will continue in use as a reliable 
source of energy for decades." Burke said Colstrip 3 energy
- 17 -
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would be at the cheapest cost of any thermal plant coming on
line during the rest of the century.
Second, Burke said the Colstrip project was on schedule 
and under budget, "in sharp contrast to delays and cost 
overruns which have plagued major electric generating plants 
being built elsewhere."
While the overall requested rate increase totaled
55.4%, the amount varied among different customer classes.
Large industries faced a 65.4% boost, residential customers 
would pay 59.8% higher rates, irrigators would see their 
bills rising by 55.4% and smaller businesses and government 
agencies would face a 47.9% hike.
Listed below is the breakdown as to how the rate in­
crease would affect each customer class.
Residential $ 39.7 million or 59.8%
General $ 33,5 million or 47.9%
Irrigation $ 1.3 million or 55.4%
Street Lighting $ 2.9 million or 108.7%
Industrial Contract $ 17.8 million or 65.4%
Government Contract $606,675 or 54.6%
From the onset of the rate request, it was anticipated 
that there would be certain major issues arising in the rate 
case.
The first of these issues was the question of whether
18  -
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Montana Power needed its share of power generated by Col­
strip 3. At the time there existed electricity surpluses in 
the Pacific Northwest.
Under Montana law rate payers pay costs of plants only 
if the power produced is "used and useful." This particular 
issue, "used and useful" became the central issue in the 
case. In two other recent cases, the PSC imposed that law 
to disallow some costs that other utilities in the state 
attempted to pass on to its users.
In 1981, the PSC determined that 30 megawatts of the 80 
megawatts of electricity Montana-Dakota Utilities Company 
(MDU) was obtaining from a North Dakota power plant were 
"unneeded excess capacity." As a result, MDU shareholders, 
not users of power, absorbed those costs. These amounted to 
$2.1 million a year.
Again in 1983, the PSC denied Pacific Power and Light 
Company (PP&L) rate increases to pay its cost of abandoning 
two nuclear power plants in Oregon and Washington. PP&L had 
sought an increase of $2.025 million per year over five 
years to cover these costs.
Montana Power was aware of these two cases, but manage­
ment differentiated Montana Power and the other utility 
requests saying it amounted to comparing apples to oranges 
to plums. Unlike the MDU and PP&L plants, Montana Power's 
Colstrip facility was in Montana. Furthermore, the Colstrip
- 19 -
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project had been certified by Montana's State Board of 
Natural Resources under the Major Facility Siting Act in 
1976. Montana Power took the position that all of its share 
of power from Colstrip 3 was needed. Consequently, the 
plant would be "used and useful" when it came on line.
Another issue management expected to surface was
whether the Colstrip plant was constructed as economically
as possible. There had been charges that the project was
costing more than it should through excessive labor and
material costs. Montana Power denied this, saying that such 
allegations were unfounded.
Montana Power seemed confident the PSC would thoroughly 
investigate project construction and was equally confident 
such inquiries would substantiate Montana Power’s claims 
that the project was not only under budget but also on 
schedule. Montana Power observed too that 35% of the cost of 
Colstrip 3 was for air pollution control equipment, meeting 
state and federal clean air standards.
The final issue was how rates would be allocated among 
the different classes of customers. The PSC had previously 
attempted to devise a new method for allocating rates to 
different customer classes. In the last Montana Power elec­
tric rate case, it tried to do so and proposed reducing the 
rates for residential, small business and government 
customers and boosting the rates for irrigators and major
-  20 -
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industries. However, that attempt to categorize users was 
overturned in District Court and appealed to the Montana 
Supreme Court,
Montana Power's last electric rate increase occurred in 
the Summer of 1982. At that time, it filed for a record 
$52.9 million increase and eventually received a $31.9 
million increase in May, 1983. Montana Power was now 
seeking a rate of return of 12.56%, compared with 11.63% 
authorized in the May, 1983, order.
For years. Public Service Commissioners and Montana 
Power had engaged in a public debate about how much the 
addition of Colstrip power plants 3 and 4 would increase 
electricity rates.
The Commissioners warned that adding the two coal-fired 
power plants to Montana Power's rate base could cause a 100% 
increase in electric bills.
But Montana Power officials protested PSC figures as 
excessive and estimated the total increase at closer to 50%. 
However, Montana Power management once again missed its 
estimates. Colstrip 3 and 4 would cost consumers much more 
than the Company projected.
The Colstrip 3 rate increase was intended to include 
total costs of power transmission lines and more than one- 
half the costs of facilities that both Colstrip 3 and 4
21 -
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would share. The total Colstrip 3 and 4 project and trans­
mission lines would eventually cost $1.8 billion,
Montana Power's current electric rate base prior to the 
Colstrip 3 and 4 inclusion was $468 million. Adding Montana 
Power's share of the $1.8 billion Colstrip 3 and 4 project 
would add $540 million. It would more than double the 
existing rate base. Colstrip 3 and associated transmission 
lines would add $344 million to its current rate base to 
bring it to $802 million.
At the time of filing of the Colstrip 3 rate request, 
Montana Power declined to discuss what percentage increase 
would be sought for Colstrip 4 because their application for 
a rate increase was almost two years in the future. They 
acknowledged that forecasting utility rates, which involve 
looking at worldwide political and economic conditions among 
other things, is not easy.
The rate request brought immediate consumer opposition. 
Consumers complained to various state officials by mail, 
telephone and in person. The State Consumer Council also 
received many letters. The Council acknowledged that more 
letters than usual were being received concerning this 
specific rate request.
Public sentiment throughout the state grew, all of it 
in opposition to the filed rate request. By late October of 
1983, AFL-CIO Executive Secretary Jim Murray said the
-  22 -
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labor group would work with other "people groups" to oppose 
"rate increases which are unfair, unjust, and inequitable." 
He indicated that if the Colstrip 3 plant capacity was not 
needed, Montana Power's stockholders, not consumers, should 
foot the bill, In addition, Murray said the PSC "should not 
allow rate increases that encourage corporate irresponsi­
bility in the MPC case." The Utility made a mistake ac­
cording to Murray.
By early 1984, Montana Power was being pressured by op­
position groups. In February of 1984, Montana Power began a 
five-week advertising campaign in Montana's daily newspapers 
explaining their third and fourth power plants at Colstrip 
together with their rates and rate distribution system.
Montana Power perceived that, although the coal-fired 
plants had been in the news since they applied for permits 
in 1973, many people appeared not to understand that Montana 
Power owns but 30% of Colstrip 3 and 4. The fact is that 
four out-of-state utility companies own the remainder.
Montana Power was criticized for the ads but considered 
the ads as part of a continuing long-term effort to have 
consistent dialogue with their customers. Many people felt 
the ads were an effort to influence public opinion concern­
ing the Colstrip 3 rate hearings pending before the PSC.
October 22, 1983 marked dedication day for Colstrip 3
23 -
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and 4. Together, these twin plants would generate 1,500 
megawatts of electricity used in Montana, Oregon, and Wash­
ington. The combined project of Units 3 and 4 represented 
the largest industrial development, private or public, in 
Montana's history. This date also marked "turbine roll" on 
Unit 3.
It was a decade ago that the four Pacific Northwest 
energy companies with Montana Power formed a consortium to 
build the plants and related transmission lines. To get the 
necessary governmental permits as well as fending off of 
lawsuits brought by environmentalists, ranchers, farmers, 
and other litigants required many years. The original cost 
estimate of $500 million escalated through the years to $1.8 
billion by the time the project was completed.
As previously stated, Montana Power, the project 
manager, owns 30% of the two plants. The other owners are 
Puget Sound Power and Light, 25%; Portland General Electric, 
20%; Washington Water Power, 15%; and Pacific Power and 
Light, 10%.
Units 3 and 4 are "big sisters" of Units 1 and 2 which 
were completed in 1975-76, each generating 330 megawatts. 
The first two units are owned equally by Montana Power and 
Puget Sound Power and Light.
On March 2, 1984, the PSC refused to grant Montana
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Power authority to increase its rates even temporarily in 
order to recover its costs of building and operating the 
Colstrip 3 power plant. Montana law states that only the
portion of any operating plant that is deemed "used and
useful" may be added to the Utility's rate base.
The Company had asked permission to begin immediate 
collection of another $42.3 million to $81.3 million per 
year from its customers during the time the Commission was 
considering the Company's request for the $96.4 million rate 
increase.
The PSC announced it would follow its past practice of 
not granting interim rate increases for new utility plants. 
In addition, the Commission indicated there was too much 
controversy in the main case concerning whether or not
Colstrip 3 was even needed and that it would be inappropri­
ate to allow the Company to collect moneys to pay for it 
before that controversy was aired in public hearings, which 
were scheduled to begin on March 27, 1984.
In documents filed with the Commission, Montana Power 
said that refusal to grant an interim increase could be 
staggering for the Company and could jeopardize its ability 
to provide the present level of service. Before deciding to 
exclude Colstrip 3 costs from the interim rate increase, the 
Commission heard their own counsel summarize objections to
any temporary hike. The objections were filed by the group
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of industrial customers, the Northern Plains Resource Coun­
cil, Montana Irrigators Association, and District XI Human 
Resources Council of Missoula. All objectors challenged the 
need for Colstrip 3 electricity.
The Company responded with similar documents that the 
issue of whether the plant was needed had been settled a 
decade ago and could not be considered again by the PSC, 
The Board of Natural Resources said that plant was needed 
when it issued the construction permit for Colstrip 3 and 
its twin number 4, Under Montana law, the PSC should be 
prohibited from inquiry, after the fact, into the need for 
Colstrip 3, the Company said.
The Public Service Commission said that it would con­
sider as regular business expenses, for inclusion in any 
potential temporary increase, the interest which Montana 
Power had paid on moneys borrowed for construction of Col­
strip 3, Following that approach, the Commission would then 
be acting as if the plant was still under construction. In 
fact, it was completed and on-line. The Company had sited 
$50 million worth of financing costs in the main application 
for a permanent rate increase.
On March 6, 1984, Montana Power reversed its role and 
asked the PSC to submit testimony detailing positions it 
would take in the Utility's upcoming rate hearing. The
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motion was filed three weeks before the PSC began its 
hearings on Montana Power's request to increase its elec­
tricity rates.
Normal procedure is for the PSC staff to formally ask 
questions of a utility before a rate hearing. It is unusual 
however, for a utility to make that same request of the 
regulatory agency itself.
In a memorandum, Montana Power stated it made the 
request because of "troublesome" occurrences in past rate 
cases. Many times in past proceedings before the PSC, new 
information surfaced and had been placed on the record by 
the PSC staff. Trial and hearing lawyers seek to eliminate 
this element of surprise. Sometimes a final order had been 
issued by the PSC, only later had Montana Power learned what 
had been at issue during the hearing in the minds of the 
Commission and staff. Montana Power believed that prior to 
the hearings it was entitled to know the positions of the 
PSC and its staff under the constitutional guarantee of due 
process of law.
On March 16, 1984, the PSC denied Montana Power's
"discovery" request to know the written position of the PSC 
staff concerning the Utility's electric rate increase case.
The documents filed by Montana Power with the Commis­
sion complained the PSC was becoming not only both judge and 
jury but advocate as well in rate cases. However, the
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Commission, following the advice of legal counsel, denied 
the motions on grounds that the staff's role and interests 
in the case were already well-known to the Company.
Further, the requested amendments would have required 
the staff to submit pre-filed testimony stating its posi­
tions on issues and the basis for those positions. Montana 
Power also demanded that the PSC staff, both in its role as 
advisor to the Commission and its alleged role as "indepen­
dent analyst", submit a list of all exhibits it planned to 
introduce as evidence at the hearing and an explanation of 
them.
Montana Power also asked for permission to submit 
"discovery" requests. That is, to question orally the PSC 
staff members in advance of hearings - and to be granted 
necessary extra time to review the requested information on 
staff positions before the Company was required to submit 
its pre-filed rebuttal testimony answering other witnesses.
Company attorney Daniel O. Flanagan stated that the 
tendency of PSC staff to raise its own issues and arguments 
during hearings before the Commission had become "trouble­
some". "The PSC staff had engaged in an unprecedented level 
of discovery" Flanagan said in written arguments to support 
his motions. He said the Constitution, Montana State Laws, 
and Montana Administrative Rules all require that parties 
of contested cases have reasonable notice of disputed issues
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and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner and in 
a meaningful time.
On March 19, 1984, Montana Power made an "11th-hour"
appeal for an interim rate increase. Montana Power stated 
it would soon experience serious cash flow problems unless 
the PSC granted a temporary power rate increase. They also 
stressed that they were spending large sums for operating 
the new Colstrip 3 power plant. Those operating expenses 
were in addition to millions spent to build the plant. As 
of that date, Montana Power had not received one cent back.
The Commission was scheduled to vote on March 20, 
1984, on the issue of granting a limited interim rate in­
crease, but not for the actual construction or operational 
costs of Colstrip 3.
Montana Power's position was that unless a major in­
crease was granted soon, the Company would have to consider 
curtailing portions of its $100 million capital construc­
tion plan for 1984 and also cut back on other Company opera­
tions .
On March 20, 1984, the PSC approved an immediate $3.9
million per year electric rate increase - $38.4 million less 
than the minimum the Company said it could get by on. The 
Commission's order meant an average increase of about 2.1% 
per year in power bills for residential customers.
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The interim order temporarily rejected all claims for 
recovery of Montana Power's investment in construction and 
operation of Colstrip 3 which was on-line and producing
electricity.
The Commission stated that the temporary increase
merely updated factors of already approved portions of Mon­
tana Power's overall electric utility rate base, Montana
Power had asked the Commission to grant a $81,3 million 
immediate rate increase while the agency considered a $96,4 
million permanent hike. The Company had said it would 
accept a minimum of $42,3 million for the time being 
enough at least to begin offsetting some costs of the new 
plant and other more recent expenses. The $3,9 million 
allowance thus was far from the Company's request, a rather 
obvious point but cited by Montana Power Spokesman Dean 
Conklin, "It's a far cry from $81 million and a far cry 
from $42 million," Conklin said.
In deciding the interim rate increase, the Commission 
took notice of what it called the unprecedented controversy 
over the underlying $96,4 million rate case, PSC policies, 
the order said, do not allow interim rate increases based on 
major new plant additions prior to a thorough exploration in 
a public hearing underlying issues associated with those new 
facilities.
It could not, the Commission said, dispute that the
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Company was currently incurring expenses because of Colstrip 
3, but Commissioners said the proper recognizable levels of 
those expenses was still in question.
Shortly after the PSC granted Montana Power its 
interim rate hike of only $3.9 million. Utility President 
Paul Schmechel said on March 22, 1984, that Montana con­
sumers, in the long run, would suffer if Montana Power was 
not allowed to recover full costs of Montana Power's share 
of Colstrip Power Plant 3. Whatever portion of the elec­
tricity from Colstrip 3 not allowed in its rate base would 
have to be sold out of state.
The Company also indicated they would have to serious­
ly consider "permanently disposing" of its interest in Col­
strip 4 if the PSC disallowed Montana Power's 30% share of 
Colstrip 3. If the PSC did not provide for a reasonable 
rate-base on Colstrip 3, Montana Power would be forced to 
dispose of whatever percentage of that resource not included 
in rate base.
The only way Montana Power could receive revenue ap­
proaching its investment in Colstrip 3 would be to sell 
power on a contract basis over the long run. This would 
mean that at the time Montana Power consumers grew into all 
of Colstrip 3, that plant simply would not be available. At 
that time, Montana Power would then have no choice but to 
acquire new electricity at higher costs. Contracts for
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selling power out of state would be the only possibility 
Montana Power would have of assuring the finanacial viabili­
ty of the electric utility.
On March 21, 1984, Montana Power announced they would
reduce budgets for construction, maintenance, and training 
in view of the P S C  s refusal to grant the larger interim 
rate increase requested. The Company identified the following 
projects as being considered for curtailment:
The Alkalai Creek-Baseline 230 Kv transmission line 
and substation in Billings.
A 161 Kv transmission line from Bonner to Missoula.
161 Kv transmission lines in the Bozeman and Ennis 
areas, plus lines and substations in the Bridger, 
Laurel and Bitterroot Valley areas.
Maintenance projects considered for deferral included 
replacement of 200 feet of spillway at Rainbow Dam near 
Great Falls, rewinding of two generators at Rainbow Dam, and 
upgrading work at Black Eagle, Ryan and Hoiter Dams.
"Coping with this cash flow shortage until the final 
decision occurs in July is our main problem with this tem­
porary rate order," Montana Power President and Chief Execu­
tive Officer Paul Schmechel said in a news release. "Every 
department in every area is being required to share in the 
reduction of expenditures," he stated.
Montana Power had a $100 million capital construction
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budget plan for 1984. The Utility's new philosophy was to 
balance its outflow of cash with existing short-term bor­
rowing limits. Captial spending, in the near term, was 
limited to an amount that would not exceed the total of 
plant retirements, depreciation and deferred taxes.
C. PSC Hearings Begin
Public Service Commission hearings began on March 
27, 1984, The initial hearings presented testimony between 
Montana Power and official interveners of the case. Opening 
rounds of testimony in the Montana House Chamber also in­
cluded appearances by public witnesses including former 
State Legislators and State Representatives.
As expected, the initial testimony focused on the 
"used and useful" issue. The president of one environmental 
organization testified that there is a subtle difference 
between laws which allow a power plant to be built and laws 
which require them to be declared "useful" before power 
customers can be forced to pay for them.
On March 28, 1984, Montana Power's chief financial
officer admitted doubts about the Company's ability to re­
cover full costs of its new Colstrip 3 power plant. Frank 
Woy, Montana Power's Vice President for Finance, testified 
during the PSC's hearings that the plant had been an immense 
financial burden on the Company. In sworn testimony prior
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to the opening of oral hearings, Woy said that without an 
opportunity to earn a greater rate of return, the electric 
Utility's earnings would be inadequate to sustain the Com­
pany's credit ratings and projected operations. Credit 
ratings are essential to keeping utility capital costs down 
and in turn, consumer rates at market prices.
At the time Montana Power made the decision to go 
ahead with the $344 million plant and associated facilities 
of Colstrip 3, it was of a magnitude consistent with the 
Company's strong financial standing in the market for utili­
ties with similar projects. Comparable utilities elsewhere 
had such projects. No one foresaw the chain of economic 
events - high levels of inflation, an economic recession, 
then high interest rates - which took place during the 
decade-long development of the Colstrip project.
Futhermore, at that time, the Company had no experi­
ence with, nor received little or no feedback market reac­
tions from the nation's investment community. The PSC's 
decision to delay all requested interim rate relief associ­
ated with Colstrip 3 until a final order was issued in the 
current rate case was bound to make an impression on those 
companies elsewhere in the United States supplying the money 
Montana Power needed.
During testimony on April 6, 1984, Eugene Meyer, Vice
President of Kidder, Peabody & Company of New York, a Wall
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Street Investment Company, said that Standard & Poor's, a 
prominant rating agency, was awaiting the outcome of the 
current rate case presented to the PSC before deciding 
whether to maintain or to downgrade MPC's "A" rating. He 
said the rating agencies and investors themselves were par­
ticularly concerned about the utility Company's cash flow 
status.
The essence of the problem was whether the cash gener­
ated internally would be sufficient to cover the Utility's 
cash outflows. If not, the Utility would have to search out 
additional outside capital to pay its current bills. In 
Standard & Poor's judgement the Utility's financial position 
would be weakened and less secure if and when that new 
financing became available. Capital costs currently being 
paid by the Utility would be increased.
For a utility company, cash comes from the sale of 
products to its customers. For the most part, this is in 
the form of regulated rates. Cash flow is a key to the 
money markets' willingness to supply the money a utility 
needs to provide service to customers. Maintenance of 
financial credit worthiness is absolutely essential if a 
utility is to have access to capital markets at prime market 
rates of interest. Capital from money markets is necessary 
to finance new construction which in turn, is used to serve 
the utility's customers better. It is important to note
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that regulated utilities are distinguishable from other 
business enterprises in that they serve customers under a 
state granted franchise which requires, amoung other things, 
that customers be served upon request at reasonable rates.
In April of 1984, PSC satellite hearings began 
throughout the state of Montana. The satellite hearings 
were separate from technical portions of the hearings. 
During technical hearings, expert witnesses representing 
various groups and Montana Power would testify and be ques­
tioned by the PSC and its counsel representing the different 
interest groups. By contrast, satellite hearings were in­
tended as a forum for citizens, not expert witnesses. Any 
citizen could testify. Satellite hearings were conducted by 
members of the PSC. In its orders in past rate cases, the 
PSC had cited testimony both from members of the public 
appearing at satellite hearings and expert witnesses.
There were 26 satellite hearings held around the state 
beginning on April 16, and running until April 24. As one 
might have suspected, the majority of testimony at these 
satellite hearings was opposed to the increase. Prominent 
were statements similar to those made by expert opposition 
witnesses about Colstrip 3 being excess generation capacity, 
that Montana Power made poor investment decisions, and that 
stockholders, not customers, should be required to pay for
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Colstrip 3.
The gavel fell May 30, 1984, on the state PSC's public 
hearings on Montana Power's request for the $96.4 million 
electric rate increase. The hearings began March 27, 1984, 
but the case remained open for final written arguments by 
attorneys for the Utility, State Department of Public 
Service Regulation, and the many intervenors who presented 
testimony opposing the rate hike. The literally truckloads 
of evidence and testimony to the Commission were expected to 
take several months of deliberation.
On June 22, 1984, Montana Power announced that comple­
tion of the Colstrip 4 Power Plant had been delayed for nine 
additional months at the request of three of the five utili­
ty partners. Asking for the delay were Montana Power, 
Washington Water Power and Pacific Power and Light. Puget 
Sound Power and Light and Portland General Electric would 
have preferred to maintain the original schedule of comple­
tion.
Colstrip 4 had been scheduled for turbine testing by 
April 1, 1985, with commercial production July 1, 1985. The 
delay meant testing would not begin until late 1985 or early 
1986, and production in the Spring of 1986.
Several reasons were cited for the delay. Montana 
Power said the delay would help the Company meet its cash
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flow problems. Washington Water Power could not use the 
electricity prior to July, 1986, because the 500 kilovolt 
power lines being constructed by Bonneville Power Adminis­
tration to ship Colstrip 4 power to the Pacific Northwest 
would not be completed until that date. Pacific Power and 
Light had been trying to sell its share of Colstrip 4 
power. It's forecasters said the Pacific Northwest was 
expected to have a surplus of electricity into the 1990's. 
Puget Sound Power and Light did not seek an extension be­
cause they would be able to use their share of the elec­
tricity as scheduled.
Costs of interest were expected to rise because of the 
delay but the total project cost would remain within the 
original budget. This was primarily due to the productivity 
gains which were reached since construction began in Septem­
ber, 1979. The delay in completion of the fourth power 
plant at Colstrip would put some 300 workers out of jobs by 
the end of the year.
D. PSC Denies Request
On July 30, 1984, the State Public Service Commis­
sion voted 5-0 to grant Montana Power only a fraction of its 
electric rate increase request and refused to allow the 
Company to charge customers for its share of Colstrip power 
plant 3 because that energy "was not needed". Montana Power
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was granted a $4.1 million annual electric rate increase, 
including the $3.9 million interim increase. The PSC fully 
expected their final order to be appealed to court.
On the same day, only hours after the PSC order, 
Montana Power President Paul Schmechel offered a compromise 
to the PSC. In a major switch of positions, Schmechel said 
that as a compromise, Montana Power would be willing to see 
only half of its 210 megawatt share of Colstrip 3 added to 
the Company's rate base at the time, with the rest phased- 
in later under certain conditions. Montana Power had in­
sisted during eight weeks of hearings before the PSC that 
all of its 210 megawatts be included in its rate base
because all of the power was needed. But the PSC refused to
allow any of Colstrip 3 into the rate base, maintaining that 
power was not needed and, therefore, not used and useful 
under state law. As a result, the PSC held that consumers 
should not be required to pay for Colstrip 3 power.
Montana Power officials were surprised by the PSC 
decision. Based on earlier action by the PSC in March, 
Montana Power expected that at least part of Colstrip 3 
would be allowed into rate base. Montana Power officials 
were asked why Montana Power insisted during the rate 
hearings that it was entitled to have all 210 megawatts
included into rate base but now was willing to settle for
one half that. Montana Power replied that the Company
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believed it was procedurally correct in asking for all of 
Colstrip 3 and that it was not within its discretion to make 
a lesser offer during the hearing.
The PSC decision and its earlier one granting a $3.9 
million temporary rate increase in March brought about an 
immediate response from the financial markets, the suppliers 
of capital. Montana Power was placed on credit watch by 
rating agencies which is generally preliminary to having 
bond ratings lowered. When borrowing money, Montana Power 
would then have to pay higher market rates because the risk 
is rated as having increased. On July 30, 1984, Montana
Power's common stock dropped from the $28-29 per share range 
in March to below $22 per share. Montana Power President 
Paul Schmechel commented that the Utility's earnings were 
one-half of those a year ago "and we cannot continue to do 
business this way".
In a special meeting on August 2, 1984, Montana Power
Directors said their goal was to maintain the present divi­
dend on common stock at $2,80 per share. They felt that 
despite the recent PSC order that the Company must not 
reduce its dividend. Its financial integrity in the market 
place must be maintained, so management reasoned.
During the middle part of August, 1984, Montana Power 
was able to obtain a relatively favorable market rate of
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interest on a $25 million bond issue related to Colstrip. 
The PSC immediately used this money market fact to show that 
their recent rate order did not adversely effect Montana 
Power's credit rating. But according to Frank Woy, MPC Vice 
President for Finance, the Company's financial standing in 
the investment community was indeed in some jeopardy because 
of the PSC's refusal to increase rates to recover its Col­
strip 3 investment.
The Company's ability to obtain a more favorable 6.55% 
interest rate on bonds sold to finance pollution control 
equipment on Colstrip 3 and 4 was due to the financial 
strength of Morgan Guaranty Trust, a triple "A" rated in­
vestment bank. Montana Power pays Morgan $175,000 per year 
for a "letter of credit." That letter of credit made low 
bond rates possible because Morgan stood behind Montana 
Power, The annual payments to Morgan are, in a rough sense, 
an insurance premium for which Morgan underwrites and 
guarantees repayment of Montana Power's bonds. Because 
Morgan Guaranty Trust had a triple "A" rating by bond rating 
firms in Wall Street, the issue of tax exempt pollution 
control bonds benefited from the Morgan's investment bank's 
rating, rather than Montana Power's bond rating. Montana 
Power's current rating for top-priority debt was "A" and for 
subordinant debt was "A-minus".
Two leading Wall Street bond rating firms put Montana
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Power on a "credit watch" with negative implications in the 
Spring of 1984, after the PSC denied most of the $81.3 
million a year interim rate increase sought. As stated a 
"credit watch" usually precedes a rating reduction. On 
April 29, 1984, Standard & Poor's Corporation, one of the
bond rating firms, said the Commission's interim order 
raised serious questions about the Commission's intentions 
with respect to Montana Power's right to recover its in­
vestment in Colstrip 3. Standard & Poor’s credit watch 
bulletin said the Commission would have to provide "substan­
tially more responsive treatment" in its final order if 
Montana Power's "A" rating was to be preserved.
Neither Standard & Poor's nor Moody's Investor 
Services Inc. had updated its "credit watch" or Montana 
Power's bond rating since the Commission denied rate re­
covery on any of Montana Power's Colstrip 3 investment on
July 30, 1984. Montana Power officials met with rating
agencies to discuss updates during the week of August 13, 
1984. Bond ratings represent one widely used measure of 
estimating market risk. In bond raters views, the recent 
order of the PSC significantly increased risk levels associ­
ated with the securities of Montana Power.
On August 27, 1984, Standard & Poor's downgraded
Montana Power's stock and bond ratings. The reductions were 
greater than expected by Montana Power officials. The
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action a direct result of the PSC's refusal to include Col­
strip 3 investments into rate base, followed a similar 
downgrading by Moody's on August 16, 1984. The lower credit 
ratings would force Montana Power to pay higher rates of 
interest for money borrowed.
According to financial sources, the ratings were 
lowered as indicated below by Standard & Poor's:
Senior debt from A to BBB minus.
Subordinated debt from A minus to BB plus.
Preferred stock from BBB plus to BB.
Commercial paper from A-2 to A-3.
Standard & Poor's considers a debt rating lower than 
BBB minus as predominately speculative. With this announce­
ment, Standard & Poor's said it found the PSC order "par­
ticularly disquieting in that it would appear to portend 
further punitive regulatory treatment for the Colstrip 4 
plant under construction at that time. The order would have 
a material adverse affect on cash flow, interest coverage, 
and earned returns, and could result in further difficulties 
for Montana Power capital markets.
Standard & Poor's expected the Utility to fare better 
before the Montana Supreme Court, to whom it had appealed, 
than it did before the PSC, but doubted that Montana Power 
would get back its original ratings. If the State Supreme 
Court lets the PSC decision stand. Standard & Poor's said,
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it is questionable whether Montana Power could maintain even 
its current downgraded ratings.
It was announced on September 27, 1984, that despite
financial problems, Montana Power's Board of Directors voted 
to pay the regular October quarterly dividend of 70 cents 
per share of common stock. The reason Montana Power main­
tained the current dividend level in the face of declined 
earnings was simple. Although lowering the dividends would 
have temporarily helped the Company's cash situation, it 
would not have solved its earnings problem. A characteris­
tic of utility stocks is that stock prices are related to 
dividend yield. Cutting the dividends would cause the price 
of Montana Power stock to drop, which in turn would reduce 
common stock as a source of captial.
The Board's action was aimed at protecting long-term 
interests of the Company, rather than applying a short-term 
action that would have an adverse market reaction. Montana 
Power's 1984 earnings through August 31, 1984, had declined
to $20.2 million, compared with $43.7 million over the same 
period in 1983.
E. Phased-in Rate Request
On November 15, 1984, Montana Power announced that it
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would file for a $129.6 million rate increase to be phased- 
in during the next four years, but promised to reduce rates 
by $47,1 million during the three years thereafter.
Details of the amended rate request indicated these 
changes between then and 1991 :
$35 million or a 20% increase in January, 1985.
$24.4 million or 11% more on July 1, 1986.
$31.3 million or 13% more on July 1, 1987.
$38.9 million or 14% more on July 1, 1988, bringing
the total to $129.6 million.
A decrease of $7.8 million or 2.5% in 1989.
A further decrease of $15,2 million or 5.1% in 1990. 
Another decrease of $24.1 million or 8.4% in 1991, 
for a total decrease of $47.1 million.
The net effect would be that Montana Power customers 
would be paying $82.5 million per year more beginning in 
1991 than they are paying now. The Company's new plan for 
recovering costs of Colstrip 3 would be good for consumers 
because it would ease the pain of paying for Colstrip 3 over 
several years rather than one single increase as the Company 
earlier proposed.
Montana Power was confident that the phased-in rate 
request would be granted by the PSC. One of the primary 
reasons was that the new request was based on more up-to- 
date operating conditions. The new test year would be 1983
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rather than 1982, as used in the original rate case.
Due to serious financial conditions in Montana 
Power's electric division, Montana Power filed its new 
phased-in rate request, even though its last case was still 
under court review at two levels. It was their philosophy 
that all possible courses in seeking a resolution to these 
problems needed to be pursued. Another reason for the new 
rate case was to preserve Colstrip 3 for future Montana 
customers.
On December 12, 1984, the Montana Supreme Court unani­
mously upheld the state PSC's right to conclude, as it did 
earlier, that the Colstrip 3 power plant was not needed to 
meet present-day consumer demands. The court ruled that the 
1976 approval of the plant by the Board of Natural Re­
sources, including its finding that the plant would be 
needed, in fact, did not preclude the PSC from reaching an
opposite conclusion after the plant was constructed.
Specifically, the court said the Major Facility Siting 
Act, under which the Board of Natural Resources determined 
the plant was needed, did not directly or indirectly repeal 
the PSC's separate authority to determine whether a power 
plant was actually useful to consumers.
The Supreme Court said the Major Facility Siting Act
was an enviromental law, while the PSC's law governs rate- 
making, and the two are simply unrelated as presently
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written. Montana Power still had an appeal before the 
District Court in Butte on the PSC ruling that ordered only 
$4.1 million of a requested $96.4 million rate hike.
The price of Montana Power common stock plunged to a 
four year low on December 13, 1984, and its trading was
suspended for 49 minutes on the New York Stock Exchange as 
stockholders scrambled to sell their holdings quickly in the 
wake of the adverse ruling by the Montana Supreme Court,
The price of a common share of Montana Power stock 
closed at 18 that day, which was 5 5/8 lower than the 23 5/8 
closing price the day before. It was the largest 
percentage loss for that day on the "Big Board". The volume 
of trading of Montana Power stock was 675,000 shares that 
day, four times the normal rate. Trading of Montana Power 
stock was suspended at midday Eastern Standard Time because 
"sell orders" greatly outpaced "buy orders".
The drop in price brought an immediate, one-day market 
loss of over $105 million for the holders of 21.2 million 
outstanding shares of Montana Power common stock. The price 
of Montana Power common stock that year (1984) ranged from a 
low of 21 1/8 in late July after the PSC decision, to a high 
of 30 3/8 in January,
On December 27, 1984, the PSC granted Montana Power a 
$21.4 million interim rate increase, including about $8.5
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million for a portion of their investment in Colstrip 3 
power plant. The Commission's order raised electric rates 
by about 12 percent. As earlier indicated, the Commission 
ruled that Colstrip 3 was not needed to meet customer de­
mands for power. That ruling was still being reviewed in 
District Court. But the Commission said that based on 
present evidence from Montana Power, the new power plant was 
needed for one month in 1983, the new so-called "test year" 
being used by the Commission to determine Montana Power's 
financial needs. Most of the rest of the $21.4 million 
increase was necessary to meet higher costs of Montana 
Power's normal business operations.
On December 28, 1984, Montana Power, for the first
time since 1947, cut its quarterly dividend on common stock 
from 70 cents to 50 cents a share. This action, recommended 
by Montana Power management, was unanimously approved by 
its Board of Directors. The reduced dividend was paid 
January 31, 1985, to all persons owning common stock as of
January 8, 1985.
Montana Power's Directors resisted lowering the divi­
dend in September fearing it would cause many stockholders 
to sell the stock, driving down the stock price. But at 
this board meeting the Directors had little choice but to 
reduce the December dividend. The Company's 1984 income did 
not meet what was required to pay the 70 cent quarterly
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dividend.
Montana Power's common stock dropped again on December 
31, 1984, by 1 1 / 8  on the New York Stock Exchange. The
stock closed at 19 1/4 and Montana Power was fourth-ranked
among losers on the stock exchange at noon that day, when
ups and downs are compared. It had dropped 1 3/8 points, to
19 points, a 6.7% decline.
The opening day of hearings before the PSC for the 
phased-in rate request was May 29, 1985. At these hearings, 
on May 30, Montana Power reduced it $82.4 million annual net 
electric rate request to $73.8 million, to be phased-in over 
seven years. The change was the result of more current
information used in determining the requested amount.
June 17, 1985, was an important day for Montana Power. 
On this day District Judge Mark Sullivan of Butte ruled in 
favor of Montana Power in its challenge of a PSC decision 
denying a $92.3 million electric rate increase. Judge Sul­
livan said that the PSC, in the previous year, illegally 
decided that electricity from the new Colstrip 3 power plant 
was not needed and should not be allowed the rate increase 
to cover its investment in the facility.
In a strongly worded decision. Judge Sullivan called 
the PSC's method of determining the usefulness of the coal- 
fired Colstrip 3 plant "unreasonable, arbitrary, and clearly 
erroneous". Sullivan said the PSC unlawfully decided the
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need for Colstrip 3 when it refused to consider the need for 
the plant in meeting the Utility's current peak power re­
quirements by assuming Montana Power could meet its customer 
demands by purchasing from other sources-namely the Hanford 
Project in Washington State. Montana Power rejected Hanford 
power because Colstrip 3 was already under construction when 
Hanford became available. Sullivan continued that the PSC 
had no authority to interfere in such "basic management of a 
utility" unless it finds that the management decisions were 
"imprudent or otherwise unreasonable".
Sullivan wrote, "It is completely unreasonable to 
contend that at any given point in time, an electric utili­
ty's generation resources must precisely match its cus­
tomer's loads and reserve obligation and that any generating 
capacity over that amount is excess capacity which is to be 
excluded from rate base." He continued, saying that for the 
PSC to reasonably determine the need for Colstrip 3, the 
Commission must consider Montana Power's obligation to serve 
its customers now and in the foreseeable future. However, 
the PSC wrongly judged the need for the plant based on 
electricity demands during 1982, before the Colstrip plant 
began operation, and not on future requirements.
Montana Power on June 30, 1985, raised its electrici­
ty rates $13.6 million per year immediately after informing 
the PSC. The decision was the result of the June 17, 1985
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ruling by District Court Judge Mark Sullivan that the PSC had 
unlawfully denied Montana Power the $96.4 million rate hike 
in 1984,
Based on the contention that the PSC had not taken 
final action on the rate request within the nine months 
required by State Law, Montana Power implemented its new 
rates. The Utility believed that Sullivan's decision 
sending the request back to the PSC for reconsideration 
meant the case was not closed and, therefore, the time limit 
had elapsed.
Montana Power indicated that the interim hike, 
combined with the $13.6 million increase would raise the 
level of their rates to $35 million, which was the first 
step of the phased-in rate plan that had been proposed by 
Montana Power.
The State PSC along with State Attorney General Mike 
Greely and various other organizations attempted to appeal 
Judge Sullivan's decision but all attempts were either 
withdrawn by attorneys or failed in court hearings.
F. PSC Approves Phased-In Request
August 26, 1985, proved to be another important day
for Montana Power, The State Public Service Commission 
voted 4-1 to increase Montana Power Company's electric rates 
by $80.3 million, or 40%, phased in over eight years. Most
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of the rate increase would go to pay for Montana Power's 
share of Colstrip 3 power plant.
In effect, the PSC reversed its controversial 1984 
decision, still being argued in the courts, refusing to 
allow Montana Power to charge customers for Colstrip 3 on 
the grounds that it was not needed. The PSC used that 
rationale to deny Montana Power all but $4.1 million of the 
$96.4 million it sought in 1984,
In 1985 the PSC ruled that Montana Power's 210 mega­
watt share of Colstrip 3 electricity was needed, making the 
plant "used and useful" under state law.
Commissioner Chairman Clyde Jarvis of Helena said 
that, unlike the previous year, no evidence was presented 
that Colstrip 3 was not used and useful. The PSC bases its 
decisions on the record presented in that specific rate case 
and thus was allowing Montana Power to charge customers for 
Colstrip 3.
Montana Power had requested a phased-in increase of 
$86.5 million over seven years. The PSC reduced the request 
to $80.3 million and extended the phase-in period to eight 
years to lessen impact on consumers.
Listed below is a year-by-year summary showing how 
the consumers would be affected by the phased-in electric 
rate increase in the PSC's final order:
August, 1985. No effect. Rates already had been
- 52 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
raised by $35 million or 19.4% through two interim 
increases that will remain in effect.
August, 1986. Rates will increase by an additonal
$15.3 million or 7.1%.
August, 1987. Rates will rise by $19.95 million or
8.6%.
August, 1988. Rates will go up by $25.2 million or
1 0%.
August, 1989. Rates will increase by $26.4 million
or 9.6%.
August, 1990. Rates will begin dropping with a $7.8 
million decrease or 2.6%.
August, 1991. Rates will go down by $13.6 million
or 4.6%.
August, 1992, Rates will fall by $20,1 million or
7.2%.
The final appeal before the State Supreme Court was
settled on November 27, 1985, which was the final chapter on
the controversial Colstrip 3.
G. Rating Agencies and Rating Symbols
The purpose of this section is to provide information 
about rating agencies and their rating symbols. Further,
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its aim is to provide a better understanding of the signifi­
cance and the magnitude of the changes of Montana Power bond 
ratings during the Colstrip 3 rate case.
To assist financial markets in determining qualitative 
gradations, various rating agencies sell their service of 
rating the market quality of securities. Both Standard & 
Poor's and Moody's market and sell their rating service. 
These services rank issues in an ordinal number related to 
their measureable risk. From a negative point of view 
(i.e.; of loss potential) this is the risk of default and 
the magnitude of such a default to holders of such securi­
ties as Montana Power. The bond ratings and rating symbols 
used by Standard & Poor's and Moody's are given in Table II. 
These systems of rating bonds use three or four general 
classes represented by A, B, C, and possibly D. Within each 
class there are three grades.
Generally, only the first three grades of each agency 
are considered to be of investment grade. This is true 
without regard to the category or type of bond. Under 
present commercial bank regulations, bonds rated in the top 
four grades are generally regarded as eligible for bank 
investment portfolios by their supervising government regu­
latory agencies.
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Major Class A for both services includes only con­
servative investment issues. Assets must have a liquidating 
value ample to cover the securities; average earnings must 
exceed interest by a suitable margin so that changes in 
earnings will have no effect on the price of bonds of this 
class.
Class B securities are sometimes designated as 
"businessmen type investments." These securities yield a 
higher rate of annual income than Class A but also contain 
elements of uncertainty not found in higher major classes. 
In the highest group of Class B securities, the investment 
features outweight the speculative elements, but speculative 
factors exist. In the lower Class B group speculative 
factors predominate. The upper groups in this class may be 
said to be of investment grade, but the lowest group is 
merely a better grade of speculative issues.
Class C securities are speculative. Few investors 
would be interested in even the highest of Grade C issues. 
They may have possibilités for the future, but the risks are 
great. The lowest grade is uncertain as to both its current 
position and future prospects. Little substantive earning 
power is found in this grade, either present or future.
The D group used by Standard & Poor's indicates bonds 
in default, the specific grades indicating relative salvage
value.
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Table II
Symbols Used in Rating Bonds
Moocty's Investors Service Standard & Poor's Corporation
Rating Meaning Rating Meaning
Aaa Best Quality AAA Highest Grade
Aa High Quality AA High Grade
A Higher Medium Quality A Upper Medium Quality
Baa Lower Medium Quality EBB Medium Grade
Ba Possess Speculative Elements BB Lower Medium Grade
B Lack Characteristics of 
Desirable Investment
B Speculative
Caa Poor Standing COC
Outright Speculations
Ca Speculative in a High Degree CC
C Extremely Poor Prospects C
D
Income Bonds on Which 
no Interest is 
Being Paid
In Default, with 
Rating Indicating 
Relative Salvage 
Value
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MOODY * S BOND RATING SERVICE
The purpose of Moody's ratings is to provide inves­
tors with a system of ordinal ratings by which relative 
investment qualities of bonds may be noted.
Gradations of investment quality are indicated by 
rating symbols, each symbol representing a group in which 
the quality characteristics are broadly the same. There are 
nine ordinal ratings used to designate quality from the 
least investment risk to that denoting greatest investment 
risk.
Bonds carrying the same rating are not of absolutely 
equal quality. In a broad sense they are alike in position; 
but since there are a limited number of rating classes used 
in grading thousands of bond issues, the symbols cannot 
reflect fine shadings of risk gradations which exist.
Listed below are Moody's bond rating symbols along 
with their description of each:
'Aaa' Bonds which are rated 'Aaa' are judged to be of the 
best quality. They carry the least degree of in­
vestment risk and are generally referred to as 
"gilt edge". Interest payments are protected by a 
large and/or exceptionally stable margin. Principal 
is secure. While the various protective elements 
are likely to change, such changes as can be
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prudently visualized are unlikely to impair the 
fundamentally strong position of such issues.
'Aa' Bonds which are rated 'A a ' are judged to be of high
quality by all standards. Together with the 'Aaa' 
groupf they comprise what are generally known as 
high grade bonds. They are rated lower than the 
best bonds because margins of protection may not be 
as large as in 'Aaa' securities or fluctuation of 
protective elements may be of greater amplitude or 
there may be elements present which make the long 
term risks appear somewhat larger than 'Aaa' 
securities.
'A' Bonds which are rated 'A' possess many favorable
investment attributes and are to be considered as 
upper medium grade obligations. Factors giving 
security to principal and interest are considered 
adequate but elements may be present which suggest a 
susceptibility to impairment sometime in the future,
'Baa' Bonds which are rated 'Baa' are considered as medium
grade obligations, i.e., they are neither highly 
protected nor poorly secured. Interest payments and 
principal security appear adequate for the present 
but certain protective elements may be lacking or 
may be characteristically unreliable over any great 
length of time. Such bonds lack outstanding
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investment characteristics and in fact have 
speculative characteristics as well.
’Ba' Bonds which are rated 'Ba' are judged to have specu­
lative elements; their future cannot be considered 
as well assured. Often the protection of interest 
and principal payments may be very moderate and 
thereby not well safeguarded during both good and 
bad times over the future. Uncertainty of position 
characterizes bonds in this class.
'B ' Bonds which are rated 'B ' generally lack
characteristics of the desirable investment. 
Assurance of interest and principal payments or of 
maintenance of other terms of the contract over any 
long period of time may be small.
'Caa' Bonds which are rated 'Caa' are of poor standing.
Such issues may be in default or there may be
present elements of danger with respect to principal 
or interSt.
'Ca' Bonds which are rated 'Ca' represent obligations
which are speculative in a high degree. Such issues
are often in default or have other marked
shortcomings.
'c ' Bonds which are rated ' C  are the lowest rated class
of bonds, and issues so rated can be regarded as 
having extremely poor prospects of ever attaining
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any real investment standing.
It should be noted that Moody's applies cardinal 
numbers, 1, 2 and 3 within each ordinal rating classifica­
tion from 'Aa' through 'B' in its bond rating system. The 
cardinal modifier 1 indicates that the security ranks in the 
higher end of its ordinal rating grade; the cardinal number 
2 indicates a mid-range ranking; and 3 indicates that the 
issue ranks in the lower end of its grade.
STANDARD & POOR'S BOND RATING SERVICE
A Standard & Poor's bond rating is a current assess­
ment of the credit worthiness of an obligor with respect to 
a specific debt obligation. This assessment may take into 
consideration obligors such as guarantors, insurers, or 
lessees.
The bond rating is not a recommendation to purchase, 
sell or hold a security, nor does it comment as to market 
price or suitability for a particular investor.
The ratings are based on current information furnished 
by the issuer or obtained by Standard & Poor's or from other 
sources considered reliable. Audits are not performed in 
connection with any rating, and on occasion, unaudited 
finanacial information is relied upon. The ratings may be
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changed, suspended or withdrawn as a result of changes in or 
unavailability of such information or for other circum­
stances.
The ratings are based, in varying degrees, on the 
following considerations;
I. Likelihood of default - capacity and willingness of 
the obligor as to timely payment of interest and 
repayment of principal in accordance with terms of 
the obligation.
II. Nature and provisions of the obligation.
III. Protection afforded by and relative position of, the 
obligation in the event of bankruptcy, reorganiza­
tion or other arrangement under the laws of bank­
ruptcy and other laws affecting creditors' rights.
Rating symbols and definitions which are used by 
Standard & Poor's are listed below:
'AAA' Bonds rated 'AAA' have the highest rating assigned
by Standard & Poor's. Capacity to pay interest and 
repay principal are extremely strong.
'AA' Bonds rated 'AA' have a very strong capacity to pay
interest and repay principal and differ from the 
highest rated issues only in small degrees.
'A' Bonds rated 'A' also have a strong capacity to pay
interest and repay principal, although they are
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somewhat more susceptible to adverse effects of 
changes in circumstances and economic conditions 
than bond in the two higher-rated categories.
B B B ' Bonds rated 'BBB' are regarded as having an adequate 
capacity to pay interest and repay principal. 
Whereas, they normally exhibit adequate protection 
parameters, adverse economic conditions or changing 
circumstances are more likely to lead to a lesser 
capacity to pay interest and repay principal for 
bonds in this category than for bonds in the three 
higher-rated categories.
'BB'
'B'
'CCC
'CC'
c
'D'
Bonds rated 'BB', 'B ', 'CCC' and 'CC' are regarded,
on balance, as predominantly speculative with 
respect to capacity to pay interest and repay 
principal in accordance with the terms of the 
obligation. 'BB' indicates the lowest degree of
speculation and 'C C  the highest degree of
speculation. While such bonds will likely have some
quality and protective characteristics, these are 
outweighed by large uncertainties or major risk 
exposures to adverse conditions.
The rating 'C ' is reserved for income bonds on which 
no interest is being paid.
Bonds rated 'D' are in default, and payment of
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interest and/or repayment of principal is in arrears
The ratings from 'AA' to 'BB' may be modified by 
addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show relative 
standing within the major rating categories.
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS
One might conclude that final approval of the phased-in rate 
plan suggests that Montana Power was not defeated by the 
PSC. This is not necessarily true. The final order issued 
by the PSC was a compromise by both participants. Although 
Montana Power would have preferred the original rate plan, 
it settled for the phased-in plan. This severely limited 
the amount of immediate rate relief for a financially 
troubled company.
The PSC based its original denial on the basis of 
"used and useful", under existing Montana State law. How­
ever, the base year of 1982 that the PSC was required to use 
in the original case did not accurately reflect and depict 
the actual balance between loads and resources. In the 
phased-in rate case the base year, 1983, was used. This 
effectively changed the basis of the earlier decision. As 
this new information, based on a more current test year, 
became part of the new rate case it became a deciding 
factor in the final opinion ordered by the PSC to allow 
Colstrip 3 into rate base.
To contend that Montana Power defeated the PSC may be 
accurate in degree. Colstrip 3 was a ligitimate rate base 
item and this required proof under the conditions set by
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law. In the end Montana Power succeeded in proving this to 
the PSC and the rate request was then approved. Montana 
Power has never gloated over the final approval order but 
was nonetheless pleased that they succeeded in placing Col­
strip 3 into rate base even with a phased-in plan. Montana 
Power has continued to pledge cooperation with the PSC.
Throughout the Colstrip 3 rate case there was almost 
no mention made of the importance that the ratings of 
Montana Power's securities had and the actions taken to 
sustain them at pre-rate case levels.
Table III shows changes in Montana Power's securi­
ties ratings during the period of the Colstrip 3 rate case. 
Even though Montana Power's securities are rated by more 
than Standard & Poor's Corporation and Moody's Investor 
Service, Inc., these two rating agencies are the largest, 
most prestigious agencies in the industry and are repre­
sentative of the others.
During this period of time Moody's downgraded Montana 
Power securities twice while Standard & Poor's downgraded 
only once. The time of the downgradings corresponded very 
directly to their appraisal of adverse conditions at Montana 
Power. Both rating agencies downgraded Montana Power in 
August, 1984. Moody's on August 16, and Standard & Poor's 
on August 27. This was in response to the news that the PSC
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had decided to disallow Colstrip 3 into rate base. The
decision by the PSC was officially announced on July 30,
1984.
Table III
Changes in Montana Power Company Security Ratings
1/1/83
8/16/84
8/27/84
1/2/85
10/7/85
12/16/85
Senior Debt 
Unsecured Debt 
Preferred Stock 
Commercial Paper
Senior Debt 
Unsecured Debt 
Preferred Stock 
Commercial Paper
Senior Debt 
Unsecured Debt 
Preferred Stock 
Commercial Paper
Senior Debt 
Unsecured Debt 
Preferred Stock 
Commercial Paper
Senior Debt 
Unsecured Debt 
Preferred Stock 
Commercial Paper
Senior Debt 
Unsecured Debt 
Preferred Stock 
Commercial Paper
Moody * s
A-3
Baa-1
A-3
P-1
Baa—3 
Ba—1 
Ba-1 
P-3
No
Change
Ba—1 
Ba-2 
Ba-2 
P-3
No
Change
A-3 
Baa-1 
Baa—1 
P-2
Standards ^  Poor * s
A
A-
BBB+
A-2
No
Change
BBB-
BB+
BB
A-3
No
Change
BBB+
BBB
BBB
A-2
No
Change
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On January 2, 1985, Moody's again downgraded Montana
Power securities. This correlates with the announcement by 
Montana Power officials on December 28, 1984, that they
would be forced to cut the fourth quarter dividends due to 
the financial trouble associated with the Colstrip 3 case.
Later, both rating agencies raised the ratings on 
Montana Power securities. The upgraded ratings were the 
result of an August 27, 1985, final order by the PSC to
approve the phased-in rate request. Standard & Poor's up­
graded their ratings on October 7, 1985, and Moody's up­
graded on December 16, 1985. Neither of the ratings at this 
time were to the level of the pre-rate case ratings. The 
improved credit ratings meant Montana Power would be able to 
negotiate lower interest rates when it borrowed money.
It is interesting to note that the changes in ratings 
of Montana Power securities showed little or no effect on 
the price of their common stock. Table IV indicates the 
daily closing price of Montana Power's common stock for the 
period of the Colstrip 3 rate case. During the period of 
the three downgradings, the stock price remained essentially 
unchanged. Although after the two upgradings in late 1985, 
Montana Power common stock continued to climb.
- 67 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
— * —* —* t O C D - O C 7 ) ( J laj-oo)tn**L^N>-*o
fsj K j fNj ro  ro  
•<1 CD CD 0 0  CD
-a  tJi cn tn  o i
CD 0 0  0 0  CD CD
M  f o  rv> i s j  r o  
œ  CD O  CD CD
«►I H» c-i OJ 
ID  QO CD ro
fv» IS.) Kj po ro 
CD GO 0 0  CD 00
ro po K) fo
-vj -vj -s3 - O
w  w  w  ^ ̂  ̂  ̂  
X?* -C> f s j  CD
K) ro
-O -sj
-J
CD
NO PO PO N J rs>“O <«iij -«O ‘«0 *o
-Ü "s] w 
£> CD CD CD ^
P'J NJ N) M PO 
-O -O CD -sJ 0>
00 CD
-0
CO ^
NJ psj p*o ro NJ 
Œ  CD CD 00  CD
X> CD NJ J>
M  NO PvJ 
CD CD CD
l\j-O
i - ' cn «0
^  0 0  OO CD CD
INJ N» NJ (O (jO U> N>CD
-3
00
NO PN> hJ hjto CD 00 CD
04 -J
CO OD GO CD
r Psj ^
f I tj4
,*î- A' PvJ
. \ j  M  W  Pv) OJ 
U» < 0  O  (£3 O
L I cn -o^  ̂  ̂  ̂r» œ ■* CD CD
N J N ) rs j N J N> 
CD 00  CD CD -O
rv j N3 PO NJ N» 
CD CD CO CD -O
I—» -O 
03  CD
fo fo po ro N> 
(jO to CO (D <D
-J -J -«J 01^  ̂  ̂  ^  ^  
CD 0 0  CD X> CD
P\J K ) N J ro
-O -O *>J LJ 
c n  00  CD x>
N3 IN) NJ NJ NJ
CO to 10 (O CO
o *
CD
W  k-*^ ̂  
CD 0 0  00
PNJ NJ 
(O CO
I—  W  
ho -p*
1 3
33
X >
T3
3]
X *
•<
w
c z
2
C
*E>ctn
cnrn1?
om
CDC
omo
O£u
h-*
<
O
oto
H*
0O
I’D
n
|(D
Iw
|o "H
-h QlM cr(O 3 i-j03 O m04 3
M" H4m <c
3tu
X)o
cfOn
oo
3
9D
3
tor+-
On
X“
-  68 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ta11 g 3V
l y  Cl  c t  i  r. Q P r i c e s  o f  FScnt e n a  Pot ier  Co réen S t o c k  
1S84
JAN FEB WAR APR MAY 11UK lUL AUG 5EPT CET NOV DEC
1 29 7/8 28 5/8 25 1/2 25 3/8 22 24 5/8 23 5/6
2 29 3/4 28 3/4 26 3/4 24 3/4 25 3/8 22 1/4 24 3/8 23 7/8
3 29 1/2 29 3/4 26 1/3 24 3/4 25 1/4 22 1/8 Labr Day 23 7/8 23 7/8
4 29 3/4 26 3/8 24 1/2 25 5/6 22 1/2 24 1/4 24
5 29 5/8 28 3/4 25 7/8 25 1/4 25 1/8 22 1/2 24 1/4 24 7/8 23 5/8
E 29 5/8 30 1 2P 1/2 25 7/6 25 3/2 25 22 1/4 23 24 3/4 24 ; '2
7 30 28 1/4 24 7/8 25 3/8 22 3/4 22 7/8 24 1/2 24 i, 4e 30 28 1/4 25 1/2 25 3/8 23 1/8 24 1/4 24 5/8
s 29 7/8 29 5/8 28 1/4 25 7/8 25 5/6 25 1/8 23 3/8 24 1/4 25
10 29 7/8 29 1/e 25 7/8 25 7/8 25 1/6 23 1/8 23 1/8 24 1/8-4 24 1/6
11 29 7/8 25 3/4 26 25 1/4 24 7/8 23 1/4 24 1/2 24 3/8
1 2 30 1/4 28 1/4 26 25 3/8 25 23 24 5/a V e t, C 3 y 23 5/8-
13 30 3/8 29 28 1/8 26 25 5/9 25 23 1/8 23 3/8 24 3/4 18
14 28 5/8 28 1/8 25 3/4 25 1/2 23 1/8 23 5/8 25 18 1/2
15 26 1/2 28 3/8 25 5/3 25 5/8 22 7/8 24 1/2 25 1/8
15 30 28 3/4 28 1/4 25 3/4 25 5/8 24 7/8 22 s /e -2 24 1/4 25 1/3
17 30 38 5/8 25 7/8 25 1/2 25 23 23 5/8 25 17 1/4
1 8 30 25 7/8 25 1/2 25 5/8 24 3/4 23 3/4 25 5/8 17 1/8
1 9 29 7/8 28 26 1/8 25 5/8 25 24 1/8 25 1/8 25 17
2D 28 7/8 Pres.Day 28 1/4 25 7/8 25 22 7/8 24 3/8 25 IB 3/4
21 28 5/8 28 1/4 25 5/8 25 3/4 22 5/8 24 7/8 24 7/e
22 28 1/4 28 3/6 25 1/2 25 7/8 22 5/8 24 7/8 Thksgvnc
23 •29 5/8 28 1/4 28 1/8 25 1/4 25 3/8 24 7/8 22 3/4-3 24 7/6 Holiday
23 5/8 28 26 1/4 25 24 5/8 22 1/2 24 3/4 25
29 1/2 25 7/8 24 3/4 25 7/8 24 S/8 24 1/2 25 X -mas
29 1/2 28 28 28 23 1/4-1 24 3/4 2*4 1/2 24 3/4 18 1/2
29 28 3/8 28 25 7/8 26 23 1/6 22 3/8 25 1/8 25 20 1/4
28 1/2 28 fleei.Cay 26 22 3/8 25 1/8 25 1/8 20 3/6-1
28 1/2 27 1/2 24 3/4 25 3/8 22 24 1/4 24 7/8
28 1/2 27 25 3/4 24 7/8 21 7/8 22 1/8 24 1/4 24 1/4
29 25 1/4 25 1/8 21 3/8 22 1/8 24 3/8 23 5/8 19 1/4
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News media says PSC will deny Colstrip 3 
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Table IV
Daily Closing Prices of Montana Power Common Stock
1985
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC
1 19 1/2 22 1/8 22 3/4 21 7/8-2 26 1/8 27 5/8 28 1/6 30 1/2
2 19 22 3/4 23 28 27 7/8-4 Latr Day 28 1/6 31 3/6
3 19 1/6 22 7/8 23 1/4 26 3/6 28 1/2 29 1/8 28 1/6 32
!< 19 /': 19 3'6 22 1/3 23 >■: 1/e 29 5/E 28 1/2 30 1/ 32 ■’ /r
5 20 3/6 22 25 1/2 28 7/8 28 1/8 29 3/6 30 32 1/6
6 20 3/6 22 1/6 23 7/8 25 1/2 27 3/8 29 7/8 30 1/8 32 1/4
7 19 1/2 21 3/6 22 1/8 23 3/6 25 1/2 27 5/8 27 7/8 30 3/8
8 19 5/8 21 3/8 22 3/8 22 3/6 23 5/8 28 1/8 27 3/4 27 1/8-5 30 1/2
9 20 1/8 22 3/8 23 5/8 28 3/4 27 7/8 30 5/8 27 32 1/2
10 20 1/6 21 1/2-1 23 3/6 25 3/8 29 30 1/8 27 7/8 32 7/8
11 20 3/8 21 3/8 22 1/2 21 1/2 25 5/8 29 1/6 30 28 1/8 Vet .Day 33 1/8
12 21 1/8 22 1/2 21 5/8 26 29 28 1/8 29 1/8 30 3/4 33 1/8
13 21 1/2 22 3/8 23 3/4 26 28 1/6 28 3/4 30 1/2 33 1/8
U 20 3/6 22 22 1/6 23 1/2 26 28 5/8 28 1/4 30 1/2
15 20 3/6 22 7/8 22 1/6 21 3/4 23 5/8 29 28 7/8 28 1/2 30 1/6
IB 20 7/8 21 3/6 23 7/8 29 28 7/6 29 28 5/8 33 3/8
17 20 1/2 21 1/2 24 1/2 26 1/8-3 28 3/6 28 3/4 28 7/8 34 1/8-9
18 20 5/8 Pnes.Day 22 1/8 21 1/2 27 7/8 28 1/8 29 29 3/6 30 5/8 33 1/4
19 22 5/8 22 1/6 21 3/6 27 7/8 28 29 1/8 26 7/8 30 1/6 32 5/8
20 22 5/8 22 26 3/6 27 5/8 29 1/2 28 7/8 30 5/8 32 3/6
21 20 1/2 22 1/2 21 3/6 26 5/8 27 7/8 29 1/2 30 1/8 30 5/8
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3 19 3/8 23 21 5/8 24 1/6 26 1/6 28 7/8 30 31 3/8
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Montana Power's common stock price although not greatly 
affected by the changes in ratings, did react to the more 
publicized actions of the Public Service Commission and 
court rulings. The most pronounced example was on December 
13, 1984, when Montana Power common stock hit a low of 16
5/8 as a result of the previous day's Supreme Court ruling 
against Montana Power.
During the Colstrip 3 rate case, most of the attention 
was focused on the effect that the rulings were having on 
the stock prices. Although this is very important, perhaps 
an even more important portion of the Montana Power's 
financing was being forgotten. The access to borrowed funds 
and the ready sale of its bonds are crucial to the financing 
of a utility.
The effect of rating agency decisions to change the 
ratings on Montana Power securities thus had its greatest 
impact on the borrowing of funds and on the marketability of 
its bond issues.
When Montana Power was denied Colstrip 3 investment 
into rate base on July 30, 1984, the rules of the game
changed. Montana Power had made the assumption that, at 
worst, a major portion of the rate request would be al­
lowed. The final PSC order approving only $4.1 million of 
the $96.4 million request took Montana Power by surprise. 
Both short-term and long-term financing plans had been made
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assuming the rate request would be approved. The result was 
a shortage of income and a severe cash flow problem.
In order to compensate for the loss of required funds, 
Montana Power opted to curtail spending rather than depend 
on new (and more expensive) short-term borrowing. Montana 
Power announced that the Company would enter an austerity 
program in which both construction and maintenance programs 
were reduced, employee salaries frozen, and even an early 
retirement plan was considered. The latter, as a cost 
saving method, was abandoned when it was realized that a 
majority of those who qualified for early retirement were in 
key positions that would require replacement, thus nulli­
fying any cost savings.
Montana Power’s philosophy was to reduce spending to a 
point at which they could rely on established lines of 
credit at existing rates. Indications show that they were 
successful in doing so. This management philosophy proved to 
be even more critical as time passed and as their securities 
were downgraded by the various rating agencies. Montana 
Power knew that lower ratings indicated a higher cost on 
borrowed funds as a result of greater credit risk for any 
new bond issues. Montana Power decided not to participate 
in the market place as they would under normal business 
conditions, and instead balanced existing lines of credit
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with spending to eliminate the need for new and more expen­
sive sources of financing.
Although Montana Power survived the crisis without 
enduring increased costs of funds, there was indeed a price 
paid by the Utility associated with the downgrading of its 
securities and the resulting austerity program. Many man- 
hours of labor were expended in budget meetings, strategy 
meetings, and information gathering, along with travel ex­
penses (some to the rating agencies). Other types of costs 
include a lower quality of service to the customer caused by 
construction and maintenance cuts, and a lowering of employee 
morale due to frozen salaries and lack of funds to perform 
their job functions properly.
Even today, Montana Power continues to operate under 
financial constraints. Top management has decided that 
Montana Power will not request additional rate increases 
while the phased-in increases are in effect through 1991. 
In order to operate under this decision, Montana Power will 
limit their annual expenditures to the level of total plant 
retirements, depreciation, and deferred taxes, thus re­
quiring no further increase in rates.
In 1983, Montana Power Company implemented a reorgani­
zation plan which grouped all of their non-utility subsidi­
aries under a new subsidiary, Entech, Inc. The utility
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portion of the Company is grouped into its Utility Division.
The split between regulated and non-regulated portions 
of the business was forced by two separate issues. For 
several years, decisions by regulators of large utility 
monopolies have been to deregulate their operations and to 
limit the extent that the utilities monopolize the industry. 
The prime example of this type of action has been the de­
regulation of the Bell Telephone System, They have been 
forced by their regulators to break their control of the 
telecommunications network they had created, were limited to 
the type of services they could provide and had to give up 
segments of their system to other companies, particularly 
the local phone sales and services.
Other large utility monopolies were also forced into 
sharing their market. Several large natural gas transmis­
sion utilities are now forced by law to allow other 
companies to use their transmission pipeline network to 
transport products to the market place.
Montana Power was aware of these changes, and in order 
to be better prepared for the new laws, decided to separate 
the regulated utility portion of business from non-regulated 
activités. This change should prove to place Montana Power 
in a better position to continue to operate successfully in 
the newer changing times.
Another reason for separating the business between the
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regulated and non-regulated activities is probably more 
obvious and direct. Although the Colstrip 3 rate request 
and its associated problems was not filed until September 
30, 1983, and was not initially denied by the PSC until July 
30, 1984, Montana Power realized that the most profitable
method of operation for most of its subsidiaries would be to 
conduct business in non-regulated markets. By continuing to 
include its non-utility operations in its utility business, 
the entire Company would fall under regulation by the PSC. 
This meant that all of its operations were limited to a 
regulated rate-of-return and would also be under jurisdic­
tion of the PSC. Montana Power chose to break away from the 
PSC control as much as possible by separating its non­
utility subsidiaries. This business plan appeared to be to 
the future benefit of the subsidiaries because problems 
associated with the Colstrip 3 rate case that caused the 
Utility Division considerable financial difficulty. By 
creating Entech, Inc., Montana Power was able to operate its 
subsidiaries outside the control of the PSC and without the 
difficulties of regulation. It's clear that Montana Power 
anticipates that there will be continued conflicts with the 
PSC on regulatory and particularly rate-related requests in 
the future.
Montana Power was not necessarily a pioneer in this 
area. Many utilities around the country were also
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separating their activities, and many more continue to do so 
today,
For the future, Montana Power should consider legal 
changes in the system. Two areas of concern may create 
better results in upcoming rate cases. The first item would 
be the method in which projects are allowed into rate base. 
Currently, a project that is under construction is not 
allowed into rate base until it is completed and in use. 
For major construction projects, such as generating plants, 
the time from start to finish involves several years. If 
projects under construction could be added to rate base 
gradually, say on an annual basis and on percentage com­
pleted, this would eliminate the large rate request and rate 
shock at the end of the project and also provide a return on 
investment earlier for the utility.
The second item might be for legislative review of the 
system by which Public Service Commissioners are elected to 
the Commission. At this time, the five commissioners are 
elected from their respective districts. The problem here is 
that many times commissioners are elected that lack qualifi­
cation or are elected because they promise to vote against 
all rate increases. This sounds irrational, but it happens. 
An alternative to the elected Commissioner would be an 
appointed Commission. This change could be instrumental in
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providing equitable rate consideration in future cases.
In conclusion, the Colstrip 3 rate case was a strong
learning experience for Montana Power. The Company was
forced to operate under conditions that required innovative 
solutions in areas unfamiliar to management, i.e., financial 
problems, austerity programs, and an unpredictable Public 
Service Commission. It appears to this writer that Montana 
Power is on a recovery path. The phased-in rate schedule has 
been approved by the PSC, Montana Power securities have been 
upgraded, public opinion of the Company has improved, and its 
common stock has recently topped $42 per share.
After a long rough period, things are beginning to look 
better for Montana Power. With Colstrip 3 troubles behind, 
Montana Power will now be able to concentrate on other
business activities. In 1985, nonutility operations 
accounted for 32% of their $57 million income. Montana 
Power has developed the Jewett Lignite Mine in Texas to 
supply Houston Lighting and Power's new Limestone power
plant and has plans of getting another new mine into 
production in Alabama as early as 1987.
Montana Power is also developing the Chartam Gold 
Property near Helena which they acquired from the Anaconda 
Company in 1985. Total acquired mining rights include some 
800,000 acres containing lead, zinc, copper, and precious 
metals. They have also formed a partnership with a Brazilian
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firm to explore for gold in both Brazil and the United 
States.
Along with mining interests, Montana Power has three 
startup companies under way to exploit their expertise in 
microwave communications, power plant automation products 
and hazardous waste disposal.
In 1985, Montana Power's earnings were nearly 40% below 
their 1983 high but were up 10% from the 1984 low and up 
another 20% in the first half of 1986. For Montana Power, 
the immediate future looks a lot more promising than the 
recent past. Earnings should continue to climb for the 
foreseeable future - partly due to the rate phase-in plan 
and partly because of the nonutility interests.
The lessons learned and the experience gained during 
this rate case might well be the subject for another paper. 
Few at Montana Power will soon forget the era of Colstrip 3. 
Would Montana Power fund a further study to assay the 
knowledge gained from this rate case? One who read this 
paper suggested a Ph.D. dissertation type study might be 
appropriate.
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